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Larry from the Left: An Appreciation
Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie**

I. Introduction
Scholars live on through ideas. And Larry Ribstein had ideas about law
schools, firms, and markets that will live on long after him. He spoke to the work
through “Ideoblog,” a blog whose motto was: “A blog about ideas. Ideas are not
beliefs or opinions.”1 It was a surprisingly esoteric motto for a writer not afraid to
dole out harsh criticism. But it captured something special about Ribstein: his
attraction to the power of ideas. He was not a sentimentalist, nor a yellow-dog
Republican or Democrat. He followed his scholarly and ideological principles
and advocated ceaselessly for their implications.
One might expect a progressive paper on Larry’s legacy to focus on the
importance of responding to his work in developing a compelling critique of
conservative law-and-economics scholarship. Something along the lines of:
“Ribstein’s formidable development of the case for free-market libertarianism
provides a useful whetting stone upon which to hone a new programme for
economic equality.” But that is not our approach. Instead, our claim—a bolder
one, but perhaps more tenuous—is that progressive corporate law scholars can
and should find ideas for legal reform in Ribstein’s voluminous writings. And
this endeavor does not involve cherry-picking a passage here or a footnote there.
Many of Ribstein’s most important ideas—his attack on the “nexus of contract”
theory for public corporations and his idealized vision of small-c capitalism and
the competition it engenders—provide support for a world that is more
egalitarian, less protective of elites, and more robust in the economic
opportunities that it offers. His attacks on certain liberal tropes should lead not to


Professor, Hofstra University School of Law.
Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. A version of this paper was presented at the
January 2013 annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS). The authors
thank Lyman Johnson for his commentary on the paper at AALS. Part II of this Essay is based on
our discussion of Larry Ribstein’s book, “The Rise of the Uncorporation,” in Grant M. Hayden &
Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of “Nexus of Contracts” Theory, 109
MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2011).
1
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header
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Ribstein’s
“Ideoblog”
website.
Ideoblog,
http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog, which is no longer active. Ribstein later joined the Truth
on the Market blog, and his posts from both that blog and his earlier Ideoblog are archived at that
site. Truth on the Market, at: http://truthonthemarket.com/author/larryer/.
**
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an instinctual defense of those tropes, but rather a reexamination of their
underlying premises. In many situations, progressive scholars may conclude that
Larry was right—or, at least, had ideas that would make the world a better place.

II. Larry as Corporation Critic
Because Larry Ribstein was an avowed contractarian, one would have
expected him to agree with mainstream corporate law scholarship, which remains
centered on the “nexus of contracts” approach. And in fact, much of Ribstein’s
writings accord with the view that corporate law should be structured so as to
allow the individual players to create economic relationships on their own terms.
He hated the increasingly regulatory approach of corporate law, taking
particularly aim at the two big federal acts that had come along in the past
decade. 2 However, while many scholars thought that the federalization of
corporate law was an unfortunate encrustation on the existing state-oriented
approach, Ribstein seems to have begun to have doubts about the entire
enterprise. In other words, he had begun to doubt that the core premises of
corporate law still longer held true.
The “nexus of contracts” theory holds that the firm – and by extension the
corporation – is merely a central hub for a series of contractual relationships.3 In
other words, the firm is a “legal fiction;” it is “not an individual” and has no real
independent existence.4 Instead of thinking of the corporation as an independent
entity, “nexus of contract” theory breaks it down into its component parts.5 These
parts are the contractual relationships between the various parties involved with
the firm: executives, directors, creditors, suppliers, customers, and employees.
Thus, corporate law is an extension of contract law and should focus on

2

HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT WE’VE
LEARNED; HOW TO FIX IT (2006); Larry E. Ribstein, Financial Reform That Isn’t, FORBES.COM,
July 15, 2010, at: http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/08/financial-reform-bill-hedge-funds-opinionscolumnists-larry-e-ribstein.html.
3
Michael C. Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Capital Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
4
Id. at 310-11.
5
See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal,
74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989) (defining the “nexus of contracts” approach as “the firm is a legal
fiction that serves as a nexus for a set of contracting relations among individual factors of
production”).

2

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2340618

facilitating the interrelationships between contractual participants in the most
efficient manner.6
The nexus of contracts theory has been extremely influential in shaping
corporate law theory of the past three decades.7 But despite its dominance, there
is still confusion over whether the theory is a descriptive model, a normative
prescription, or some combination of both. 8 Jensen and Meckling presented a
positive theory of the corporation and its concomitant relationships.9 That thread
has been picked up in the legal literature, with Easterbrook and Fischel cementing
the concept in place.10 But even at the most basic of levels, the “corporation as
contract” claim is simply incorrect. Corporations are not creatures of contract.
One cannot contract to form a corporation.11 The individuals involved must apply
to a state for permission to create such an entity. The fact that this permission is
readily granted (as long as fees and taxes are paid) does not change the fact that
permission is required.12 Moreover, the designation is legally meaningful. As
discussed further below, putting a series of contractual relationships within a
corporation changes those contractual relationships.

6

Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416,
1444 (1989)
7
Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on
Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (1989) (“Critics and advocates agree that
a revolution, under the banner ‘nexus of contracts,’ has in the last decade swept the legal theory of
the corporation.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88
IOWA L. REV. 1, 9 (2002) ("The dominant model of the corporation in legal scholarship is the socalled nexus of contracts theory."); Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics ,
18 J. CORP . L. 301, 303 (1993) (arguing that "the nexus-of-contracts view of the modern
corporation and the principal-agent explanation of some important aspects of the firm . . . have had
profound implications for some of the most important issues of corporation law").
8
Melvin Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual
Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 824 (1999) (“Unfortunately, it has proved easy to confuse
the positive proposition that the corporation is a nexus of reciprocal arrangements with the
normative proposition that the persons who constitute a corporation should be free to make
whatever reciprocal arrangements they choose, without the constraints of any mandatory legal
rules.”).
9
Jensen & Meckling, supra note JM, at 310-11.
10
Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J.
CORP. L. 779, 780 (2006) (describing Easterbrook and Fischel as “the primary expositors of the
contractarian theory”).
11
This fact is acknowledged by contractarian theorists. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate
Contract, supra note EF2, at 1444-45 (acknowledging that statutory corporate law is necessary to
create a corporation).
12
Cf. Bratton, supra note WB1, at 445 (“If the corporation really ‘is’ contract, as the new
economic theory tells us, then the last doctrinal vestiges of state interference should have withered
away by now . . . . But the sovereign presence persists.”).
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The fallback position of contractarian scholars is that the nexus of
contracts model is not a literal claim.13 But it’s often difficult to determine when
the theory crosses the line from abstracting metaphor to description of reality.14
To say that we should conceive of the firm as a nexus of contracts for certain
purposes is different than saying that corporations actually are simply a nexus of
contracts. 15 Yet both characterizations are used seemingly interchangeably. 16
Moreover, contractarians often seek to minimize the role of the state to such a
degree that it becomes vestigial. Easterbrook and Fischel, for example, claim that
when it comes to the corporation, “what is open to free choice is far more
important to the daily operation of the firm, and investors’ welfare, than is what
the law prescribes.”17 Corporate law thus becomes a way of facilitating the other
aspects of the corporation – the more important, contractually-based ones.18
13

Fred McChesney, for example, stated: “Admittedly, as a descriptive matter state corporation
codes and other sources of law contain many mandatory terms that parties cannot contract around.
. . . [T]o claim that contractarians would deny the existence of coercive legal rules is to accuse
them of blindness or stupidity.” Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the
Corporate Field: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530, 1530 (1989). But it is
sometimes difficult to parse the language of the theory to determine what is actually being
claimed. See Bainbridge, “Nexus,” supra note SB1, at 11 (“I have come around to the view that
the corporation is a nexus of contracts in a literal sense, albeit a very limited one.”); Julian
Velasco, Shareholder Ownership and Primacy, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 919 (“[A]lthough it may
be technically accurate to describe a corporation as a nexus of contracts, it is entirely
inadequate.”).
14
It is difficult to measure the extent to which contractarians shift their metaphor into the realm of
literal truth. Certainly, most contractarians will admit that a corporation cannot be formed through
contract. However, the theory is often described in shorthand as a positive description. See, e.g.,
MACEY, supra note JM1, at 22 (“It has long been recognized . . . that the corporation . . . should be
viewed as a ‘nexus of contracts’ or a set of implicit and explicit contracts.”); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769,
781 (2006) (“[I]t is commonplace and correct to say that the corporation is a nexus of contracts . . .
.”).
15
For a discussion of the uses and misuses of models in corporate law theory, see G. Mitu Gulati,
William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 887, 889-93, 945-48
(2000). See also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Introduction to the Metaphors of Corporate Law, 4
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 273 (2005) (discussing the use of metaphors in corporate law).
16
Bill Bratton has described how Easterbrook and Fischel moved over time from a strong version
of the theory to a weaker one. William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the PostContractual Corporation, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 180, 184 (1992) (“Easterbrook and Fischel are so
astute that they keep a safe distance from the assertion that the corporation is a nexus of contracts.
The book delimits and subordinates this once foundational proposition.”).
17
Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Contract, supra note EF2, at 1418. They continue: “For debt
investors and employees, everything (literally) is open to contract; for equity investors, almost
everything is open to choice.” Easterbrook and Fischel assumedly are only speaking of state
corporate law here, as there are significant regulations placed on debt and employment contracts.
18
As Easterbrook & Fischel state:
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Thus, contractarians have two competing sets of positive claims, with two
sets of normative takeaways. 19 First, they argue that the corporation is primarily
contractual, and as such it represents terms that the parties have freely chosen
amongst themselves. Since the terms have been freely chosen, we can presume
they are efficient.20 This claim leads to the normative perspective that since the
corporation is merely an intersection of voluntary agreements, corporate law
should eschew mandatory rules.21 The second set of claims, however, suggests
that corporate law does provide default or even mandatory terms in those
situations where these terms are approximations of the will of the parties. 22 These
mandatory terms trump contractual freedoms, but they are designed so that the
parties may more efficiently go about the rest of their business. The concern for
these mandatory terms is mitigated, because there is choice amongst the fifty
states as to the laws of incorporation.23
Larry Ribstein was a contractarian. Prior to his book The Rise of the
Uncorporation, his work largely demonstrated agreement with the descriptive and
Why not just abolish corporate law and let people negotiate whatever contracts they
please? The short but not entirely satisfactory answer is that corporate law is a set of
terms available off-the-rack so that participants in corporate ventures can save the cost of
contracting. There are lots of terms, such as rules for voting, establishing quorums and so
on, that almost everyone will want to adopt. Corporate codes and existing judicial
decisions supply these terms “for free” to every corporation, enabling the venturers to
concentrate on matters specific to their undertaking.
Id. at 1444.
19
Klausner, supra note MK1, at 783 (“Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory of corporate law is both
normative and positive: that corporate law should take this form; and that it ‘almost always’
does.”).
20
A more nuanced version of this would be: having the parties choose their terms is the system
most likely to lead to an efficient result over time, as there is no other system likely to result in
greater efficiency.
21
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of
Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 860 (1997) ("The nexus of
contracts model has important implications for a range of corporate law topics, the most obvious
of which is the debate over the proper role of mandatory legal rules."); Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
Foreword: The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395,
1397 (1989) (noting that corporate law contractarians argue “that the contractual view of the
corporation implies that the parties should be totally free to shape their contractual
arrangements”).
22
MACEY, supra note JM1, at 22 (“[B]usiness law, including corporate law, exists to economize
on transaction costs by supplying sensible ‘off-the-rack’ rules that participants in a business can
use to economize on the costs of contracting.”).
23
See, e.g., ERIN E. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009); ROBERTA
ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993).
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the normative aspects of the nexus of contracts theory. His most direct discussion
of the theory is “Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the AntiContractarians,” an article he wrote with Henry Butler. 24 Butler and Ribstein
define contractarian theory as: “the corporation is a set of contracts among the
participants in the business, including shareholders, managers, creditors,
employees and others.” 25 They argue that private ordering is the best way to
arrange these relationships.26 Like Easterbrook and Fischel, however, they view
state corporation law as an extension of the contract. 27 And they are quick to
move to the “policy implication” that “private parties to the corporate contract
should be free to order their affairs in whatever manner they find appropriate.”28
“Opting Out” criticizes anticontractarians on both descriptive and
normative grounds. The authors point to the “demise” of concession theory,
based on the notion that “[t]hroughout the nineteenth century, under the onslaught
of increasingly permissive general incorporation statutes, state creation gradually
yielded to private formation of the corporation and private ordering of the
corporate relationship.” 29 They concede that “modern corporate statutes do
include many mandatory terms, including voting rules, fiduciary duties and legal
capital rules.” 30 However, they argue that these mandatory terms are, in most
cases, better characterized as some form of avoidable placeholder. Some
seemingly mandatory rules may be strong default rules that can nevertheless be
contracted around. 31 Other mandatory rules, such as shareholder voting on
mergers, can be avoided by restructuring the underlying transaction. 32 Moreover,
parties can avoid the mandatory rules from a particular state by incorporating in
another state or choosing another organizational form.33 They conclude:
24

Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the AntiContractarians , 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990).
25
Id. at 7.
26
Id. (“The corporate contract also specifies the extent to which the parties rely on the competitive
pressures from capital, product, and managerial labor markets as well as internal incentive
structures such as corporate hierarchy, boards of directors and managerial compensation contracts,
to force agents to act in their shareholders' best interests.”). Their focus, like Jensen and
Meckling, is on agency costs.
27
Id. (“The terms of the agency contract include the provisions of state law, which are regarded as
a standard form that can be accepted by the parties or rejected either by drafting around the
provision or by incorporating in another state.”).
28
Id. at 7-8.
29
Id. at 9.
30
Id. at 10.
31
Id. (discussing the close-corporation buyout rules from Donohue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of
New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975)).
32
Id.
33
Id. at 11.
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In sum, truly “mandatory”' provisions are the exception rather than
the rule in the law of business associations. The most important
mandatory provisions are the federal securities laws and state
provisions that are imposed on existing investors in firms. While
these provisions are not trivial, they do not establish the noncontractual nature of the corporation.34
Interestingly, Butler and Ribstein also criticize Easterbrook and Fischel for
not being sufficiently committed to the contractual model. They argue that
Easterbrook and Fischel use the concept of a “hypothetical bargain” to impose
certain terms upon the corporate contract.35 Calling this approach “inconsistent
with the contract theory of the corporation,” Butler and Ribstein contend that “it is
one thing to propound a default rule to cover situations not covered in the parties'
contract, and another thing to state a general rule applicable irrespective of
contract.”36 A true contractualist, in their view, would favor a default approach,
one that allowed parties to contract in accord with their preferences.37
The debate between two sets of committed contractarians over the proper
approach to the corporate rules is indicative of the nexus of contract theory’s
unsettled state – drifting between reality and metaphor, description and normative
judgment.38 In The Rise of the Uncorporation, however, Ribstein makes clear
that the descriptive claim is no longer true. The book tracks the developments of
two broad types of business organization: the corporation (in both public and
private forms) and the “uncorporation,” a collective term for a variety of
partnership-like organizations, primarily partnerships and limited liability
companies (LLCs).39 Ribstein tracks the history of these forms as two inverselyrelated lines: uncorporations predominated up until the latter nineteenth century,
at which point the corporation took off and achieved a century of dominance.
Although the corporation remains the primary form of business organization, the
uncorporation is catching up, constituting almost a third of all tax-reporting

34

Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 16-17.
36
Id. at 17.
37
Id. They discuss the example of management responses to hostile corporate takeovers.
Easterbrook and Fischel support rules requiring management passivity, while Butler and Ribstein
would impose default rules.
38
Cf. Eisenberg, supra note ME1, at 836 (finding that nexus of contract theory “can be understood
in either a very weak or a very strong sense”).
39
Ribstein, Uncorporation, at 1.
35
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business entities.40 As the title of the book suggests, the corporation is poised to
plummet as the uncorporation begins its ascent.
The Rise of the Uncorporation is a refutation of the descriptive part of the
nexus of contracts theory, at least as applied to the twenty-first century
corporation. To be sure, Ribstein is committed to nexus of contract theory in its
normative instantiation; he believes that individual participants in a business
organization should be left free to construct that organization as they see fit. But
the new organizational hero for contractarians, in Ribstein’s telling, is the
uncorporation. The uncorporation, unlike pretenders before it, is actually
something close to the pure nexus of contracts. To make his case, Ribstein uses a
foil, and that foil is the corporation.
On a fundamental level, corporations all share the same governance
characteristics. The firm is controlled by a board of directors, who in turn select
the officers who run the day-to-day business of the operation. This board is
elected by shareholders. The shareholders share in the profits of the corporation
through dividends and can sell their shares on the open market. This same basic
structure – shareholders elect directors who appoint officers – can be found in
every public corporation.41
Why is this tripartite power dynamic so uniform across corporations? Is it
because corporate law requires this structure, or because this structure is the most
efficient and therefore freely chosen? Contractarians would point to the default
nature of corporate law statutes as evidence that this structure is optimal. For
example, section 141 of Delaware General Corporation Law states: “The business
and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by
or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise
provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”42 Thus the board—
the central feature of corporate governance—appears to be merely a default rule.
Similarly, the Model Business Corporation Act states that “[a]ll corporate powers
shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the
corporation managed by or under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to
any limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation or in an agreement

40

Id. at 3.
The same is true of closely-held corporations, although the roles overlap to a great extent.
42
Del. Code tit. 8 § 141(a) (2010).
41
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authorized under section 7.32.”43 Perhaps corporations could really be arranged
in almost any possible fashion.44
However, this apparent flexibility is belied by the actual structure of most
corporations and the presence of other mandatory requirements. In practice, for
example, corporate charters are extremely homogenous.45 The diversity that one
might expect from a collection of firms with heterogeneous governance needs is
nowhere apparent.46 Moreover, the apparent flexibility of corporate law on paper
is undercut by a more complex reality. The textual openness of § 141(a), for
example, masks a fairly rigorous defense of managerial power. Shareholders’
power to amend the corporation’s bylaws under § 109(b) of the Code takes a back
seat to the more free-ranging power of § 141(a).47 In addition, many aspects of
federal securities law, particularly SEC Rule 14a-8 48 and the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act,49 assume the existence of the certain governance mechanisms, such as the
board and shareholder meetings, before adding additional requirements.50
Ribstein argues that centralized management is “[t]he feature that best
characterizes the large-firm nature of the corporation,” and the board of directors
is “one of the most distinctive features of the corporate form.”51 He contends that
“only a corporation must have a board of directors that is separate from the
executives and appointed directly by the owners.”52 Shareholder voting is part of
the “legally mandated corporate governance structure;” it is so critical that it is
43

MBCA § 8.01(b).
Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in
Public Relations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 669 (2003) (“Delaware law
accordingly treats board governance as a default rule that can be ‘bargained around’ in the
corporate charter.”). See generally Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (“Even more than is commonly realized, virtually all of corporate law
today consists of default rules rather than mandatory rules.”).
45
Klausner, supra note MK1, at 784, 786-91.
46
Id. at 783.
47
John C. Coates IV & Bradley C. Faris, Second-Generation Shareholder Bylaws: Post-Quickturn
Alternatives, 56 BUS. LAW. 1323, 1353 (2001) (“A bylaw is impermissible if its primary purpose
is to prevent or interfere with the board’s discretion under section 141(a) to manage the business
and affairs of the corporation . . . .”); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and
Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409, 428–44 (1998).
48
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) (2009).
49
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29
U.S.C.).
50
For example, Rule 14a-8 gives shareholders the authority to propose actions to the board at the
annual meeting, and Sarbanes-Oxley puts independence requirements on audit committees, which
are subcommittees of the board. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. III 2003).
51
RIBSTEIN, UNCORPORATION, at 67.
52
Id.
44
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considered “sacred space.”53 In addition, Ribstein points to transferable shares,
fiduciary duties, and capital lock-in as other essential “governance” elements of
the corporation.54 Each of these is essentially required as part of the corporate
form.55
Ribstein does not spend a great deal of time defending his characterization
of these corporate characteristics as mandatory. This is a critical point, as some
contractarians have depicted the modern corporation as the product of market
forces rather than state law. 56 It is somewhat surprising to see this article of
contractarian faith being dismissed so cavalierly by a contractarian. But the
mandatory nature of these governance “requirements” is necessary for Ribstein to
tell his political economy story. Each of these factors, to a greater or lesser
degree, plays a critical role in the government’s regulation of and control over the
modern corporation.
As Ribstein describes it, “[t]he corporate form represents a quid pro quo:
big firms get corporate features, and government gets an opportunity to regulate
governance.” 57 Thus, the board of directors is not just an efficient way of
centralizing authority, as others have argued. 58 It also plays a “politically
legitimizing role” and has the opportunity to “help constrain corporations to act
consistently with the objectives of lawmakers rather than solely those of
investors.” 59 The shareholder meeting is “not simply a way to ensure that
managers are running the firm in the shareholders’ interests, but also a mechanism
for admitting vox populi into the running of these powerful institutions.”60 Given
the power of large corporations for good and evil, Ribstein argues, lawmakers
sought to introduce internal limitations on their governance.61 Of course, tax was
an issue as well. The corporate tax—characterized as “double taxation,” since
dividends are taxed as well—was “in a sense a fee for incorporating.”62 All of
these restrictions on corporate freedom can be traced back to regulatory motives.

53

Id. at 69.
Id. at 68-75.
55
In an earlier piece, Ribstein (with Butler) argued that fiduciary duties were not outside of the
realm of contract law and thus should not be counted as evidence of a noncontractarian approach.
Butler & Ribstein, supra note BR1, at 28-32.
56
See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note HH1, at 1-2.
57
RIBSTEIN, UNCORPORATION, at 66.
58
Bainbridge, supra note SB1.
59
RIBSTEIN, UNCORPORATION, at 68.
60
Id.at 70.
61
Id. at 86-87.
62
Id. at 99.
54
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Given the corporate tax, as well as the regulation of corporate governance,
why did the great majority of businesses choose the corporation as their
organizational form? Ribstein’s answer is, largely, the promise of limited
liability. The role of limited liability has long been a bête noire for contractarians,
since it is clearly an aspect of the corporation that is not contractual. Its
importance has been minimized, overlooked, or disputed. In Rise, however,
Ribstein decisively argues that the corporation’s monopoly on limited liability
was the key to its organizational popularity.
Limited liability is the reason why the corporation succeeded where the
partnership failed. Discussing the characteristics that are specific to corporations,
Ribstein notes that “partnerships long have been able to contract for such
corporate-type features, with one critical exception – limited liability.”63 As he
makes clear, limited liability is distinctly non-contractarian: “Limited liability is
particularly important because, unlike other corporate features discussed above,
partnerships could not easily contract for it without lawmakers’ cooperation as
they have to include the creditors in these contracts.”64 Although he recognizes
that there may have been (cumbersome) contractual methods for limiting liability
for contractual claimants, it would have been “impossible” to secure limited
liability against tort claimants without the government’s help. 65 And limited
liability is not window dressing. As Ribstein concedes: “This feature is basic
because . . . it is the one that parties cannot replicate by private contract.
[W]hether a statutory form provides for limited liability therefore will dominate
parties’ choice of form.”66
Control over liability is what gave lawmakers the upper hand in directing
organizational choice. It was the carrot that states used to get businesses into the
corporate form.
The tradeoff between limited liability, on the one hand, and the tax and regulatory
treatment of the corporation, on the other, is critical to Ribstein’s political
economy narrative: “As lawmakers could control access to limited liability, they
could extract a quid pro quo for it by channeling limited liability firms into the
corporate form and then taxing and regulating corporations.”67 The delay in the
63

Id. at 76.
Id. at 79.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 138.
67
Id. at 79. Ribstein believes that the normative basis for the quid pro quo is unclear.
64

Limited liability could not be considered a subsidy to firms to the extent that
creditors adjust their credit charges for the greater risk. Even to the extent that
limited liability shifts risks to tort creditors who cannot demand compensation
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development of the uncorporation stems from legislators’ desire to maintain the
limited availability of this quid pro quo. Ribstein contends: “Government has
jealously guarded the prerogative of cresting limited liability and sought to
channel limited liability into the regulated corporate form.”68
The importance of limited liability is a theme Ribstein turns to over and
over again in the book.69 For example, the closely-held corporation makes no
sense to Ribstein as an organizational form, as it imposes a structure on small
firms that is much more suitable to larger companies. 70 In Ribstein’s view,
“[c]losely held firms’ widespread use of the corporate form indicates that the
benefits of limited liability outweighed firms’ costs of having to accept the other
aspects of the corporate form along with it.”71 This basic equation started to shift,
however, as tax reform in the 1980s made the corporate tax more onerous.
Businesses started to push for organizational forms that avoided the corporate tax
without many of the drawbacks of partnership. For a time, the Kintner
regulations 72 drew the line as to which firms would be taxed as corporations.
Because firms with limited liability were considered corporations, “the tax
classification rules effectively forced firms to pay a tax to the federal government
for complete limited liability” 73 However, as businesses grew increasingly
dissatisfied with the strictures of the corporate form, pressure grew for an
alternative. The limited liability company, originally a modest vehicle for oil and
gas companies, threaded the needle by getting classified as a partnership for tax
purposes, 74 despite having limited liability. 75 This leak in the dam ultimately
drove the IRS to adopt a “check the box” rule allowing firms to choose whether

for the additional risk, society arguably gains because investors are attracted to
socially productive ventures. However, it is not clear why limited liability firms
should “pay” for this social benefit by being subjected to extra constraints on
their operations.
Id. at 79-80.
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they wanted to be taxed as partnerships or corporations. 76 “Check the box”
opened the door for the full flowering of the “uncorporation,” as limited liability
was allowed to coexist with favorable tax treatment.
Ribstein tells a story of contractual desires ultimately breaking free of a
regulatory scheme that sought to channel businesses into one particular form.
Certainly one could tell a different story: the story of how the corporation
carefully balanced costs and benefits amongst businesses and society until interest
groups finally succeeded in cracking the tax code. This is not Ribstein’s
narrative, but it is consistent with his version of events. More importantly, both
stories emphasize the importance of the government and of organizational law to
the choice of organizational form. The corporation is not simply a nexus of
contracts. It is an organizational form with a set of state-given benefits (primarily
limited liability) along with a set of taxes and mandatory governance rules. The
state plays a much larger role in the story than contractarians have ever before
allowed.
Ribstein’s uncorporation seems to be the undoing for the nexus of
contracts theory, at least as a positive description. The corporation is not simply a
point at which myriad contracts intersect. It is instead a governmentally-created
organizational body that imposes specific constraints on participants. Conceiving
of the corporation as a simple agglomeration of private agreements—even
metaphorically—is deeply misleading. As the uncorporation demonstrates, the
corporation has many specific features that could be considered either mandatory
or quasi-mandatory. These features distinguish the corporation not only from the
realm of contract but from the uncorporation as well.
A contractarian might, at this point, turn the diversity in organizational
choice around on us and argue that the variety demonstrates a different kind of
contractual freedom. After all, as Ribstein argues, having a multitude of
organizational choices allows parties to pick and choose the organizational form
that best suits their needs.77 Businesses are no longer stuck with the corporation;
they are now free to choose any of the variety of uncorporations instead. Because
parties are still using the corporation, even in the midst of organizational
plenitude, that must mean that parties prefer the corporation. It is the choice of
the majority of businesses; it must therefore have advantages that other
organizational forms do not. In other words, we can say that the corporation is
like a nexus of contracts, in that it is freely chosen by the parties as the best
76
77
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organizational delivery system for their relationships. Even if not literally a
contractual nodule, it represents the parties’ free choice.78
This is not the argument Ribstein makes in Rise. He argues instead that
the uncorporation is a superior vehicle for addressing the problems of
contemporary organizational structure. 79 Arguing that the corporation is “far
from ideal” as a governance structure, Ribstein claims that “the uncorporation
provides potentially more efficient ways to control the agency costs of centralized
management.” 80 He argues that the traditional corporate tools for restraining
managers—shareholder voting, boards of directors, fiduciary duties, and
takeovers—have failed to provide the proper market discipline. 81 Instead, the
uncorporation’s combination of greater managerial freedom and stronger mandate
for distributions provide a better approach, in his view, for reducing managerial
costs.82
If the uncorporation is a superior organizational form, why is it only
gaining popularity now? Ribstein provides only a brief direct answer, citing the
increased salience of agency costs, greater financial complexity, and advances in
organizational development. 83 His narrative, however, describes how the
uncorporation has only recently been freed of its regulatory shackles, with “check
the box” allowing uncorporations both favorable tax treatment and limited
liability. It is state lawmakers and federal bureaucrats who created the LLC
revolution. Political forces entrenched the corporation; now those forces have
created an opening for the uncorporation.84 To the extent the uncorporation does
face challenges to its growing role, Ribstein sees those challenges largely coming
from the government.85 This is not a story of firms adapting to organizational
demands through contract. It is a story of government facilitating growth (or not)
through the organizational forms it provides:
78
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The large uncorporation’s story is still unfolding. Courts,
regulators, and tax authorities may decide that large firms should
be subject to corporate rules whatever business form they have
chosen. On the other hand, policy makers may see that the crisis in
the governance of large firms demands a fresh approach rather than
just tinkering with an increasingly unsatisfactory model.
Understanding the distinct mechanisms of uncorporations and
giving them room to operate may be a key to this fresh approach.86
In other words, it is up to government to develop the organizational forms
necessary for efficient private ordering.
It is hard to know, at this point in time, how controversial such a statement
is. Law and economics scholars such as Henry Hansmann and Michael Klausner
have moved away from the descriptive form of the nexus of contracts theory by
suggesting that government does need to play a role in creating the corporate
“contract.”87 Easterbrook and Fischel have touted a hypothetical bargain to be
used contemporaneously with the actual bargain of the parties.88 And, of course,
noncontractarians have long believed in the importance of government regulation
to the nature of the firm.89 Ribstein’s approach is in many ways unremarkable.
But it signals that, to the extent there was a debate about the positive version of
nexus of contracts theory, the debate is over.

III. Larry as Economic Liberator
Of course, it is Ribstein’s normative commitment to contractarianism that
draws him to the uncorporation in the first place. The uncorporation offers the
contractual flexibility that the corporation lacks. Indeed, “uncorporation” itself is
merely a label put on a variety of different organizational forms that offer an
assortment of organizational approaches. The flexibility represented by these
forms, both internally and as a group, allows for greater specialization and even
86
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“idiosyncratic arrangements.”90 For example, when it comes to fiduciary duties,
Ribstein notes that Delaware corporate shareholders cannot waive the duties of
loyalty and good faith, whereas that state offers much more flexibility on that
score for limited partnerships and LLCs.91 Some of this flexibility can be put to
very specific use. Ribstein advocates that business association owners have
stronger access to the firm’s cash on hand, through distributions or the power to
demand liquidation or buyout.92 This access, in his view, would provide much
greater market discipline against the managerial agency costs that have plagued
the public corporation in the last decade.93
However, Ribstein acknowledges that all is not completely contractual,
not even in the uncorporate world. Uncorporations have adopted the partnership
approach of restricting transferability of management rights. 94 Most LLCs
statutes do not provide for a default right to disassociate, in order to accommodate
tax law requirements about the liquidity of estate assets.95 And although LLCs
have more flexible governance requirements than corporations, most statutes
provide only a “binary choice between manager- and member-management.”96 In
addition, standardization may be appropriate “to clarify the expectations of the
many people with which the corporation deals.” 97 Despite his admiration for
Delaware’s freedom to waive such duties, Ribstein acknowledges that “[a]s LLCs
increasingly become the new default entity, many undoubtedly are being formed
with plain-vanilla certificates and no detailed arrangements.” 98 As a result,
restrictions on waivers in other states’ LLC statutes may make sense as long as
Delaware remains an option for sophisticated LLCs. Ribstein argues: “This
illustrates how distinctiveness can be as important among different statutory
versions of the same business associations as it is among different types of
business associations.”99
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Rather than minimizing the role of government in the uncorporation,
Ribstein’s analysis highlights it. Rise is rife with discussions of the inefficiencies
of legislative drafting,100 the importance of tax policies such as the Kintner factors
and “check the box,”101 and regulatory arbitrage.102 One is constantly reminded of
the heavy hand of the state in creating corporations and uncorporations, in all their
permutations. This approach suits Ribstein’s normative agenda, which is to
identify and eliminate market impurities introduced by legislative meddling. 103
But in his criticism of government, he must not only acknowledge that they
sometimes get it right (LLCs, check-the-box), but also that the state holds the
cards and controls the game. Entities are state creations—a fact made abundantly
clear.
At the end of the book, Ribstein cites the possibility of the un-business
association – the “fully customized firm.”104 Although he doesn’t frame it exactly
this way, one gets the sense the un-business-association would be Ribstein’s ideal
when it comes to organizational forms. Of course, at least one non-contractual
element would still be necessary. As Ribstein describes it, an un-business
association statute would allow parties to “enter into a customized contract, but
still have limited liability—a sort of ‘contractual entity.’” 105
Is this
organizational form our future? Or are we destined to have no organizational
forms at all – only contracts?
At this moment, the long-term future of corporations seems potentially
suspect. As Ribstein has well documented, the corporation is under siege by this
plethora of new organizational structures. When the Treasury moved to “checkthe-box” taxation for these new entities, they became viable alternatives to the
corporation in a variety of different fields. The flexibility of the LLC form is in
contrast to many of the requirements, state and federal, placed upon the

organizational structures” and thus “can assume an almost unlimited variety of forms”). He notes
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corporation.106 It seems, perhaps, as if Jensen & Meckling’s “nexus of contracts”
model is coming to life in the LLC, and the corporation’s failure to live up to their
model is bringing it down.
The employment relation seems to be moving from firm to market as
well. In the mid-twentieth century, labor economists identified internal labor
markets as a deviation from neoclassical labor market theory. 107 These
economists found that employees largely stayed within one firm for their lifetime
of employment, and that firms generally used internal promotion to fill vacancies.
These findings established an empirical basis for Coase’s notion of the
importance of the employment relation to the firm. Moreover, internal labor
markets are an instantiation of the separateness of the firm from the market; they
demonstrate that the firm is truly a different set of relationships. However,
economists are finding that the importance of internal labor markets has been
dwindling.
Beginning in the 1970s, firms began to hire more temporary and
contingent workers.108 This trend accelerated through the 1990s, and continues
apace. Recent reports indicate that the 2008 recession has turned many
employees into “permanent” temporary workers, with as much as 26 percent of
the workforce now having “nonstandard” jobs.109 And the effects go beyond lowskill and low-wage employment; executive officers, lawyers, and scientists are all
among the temporarily employed. 110 Moreover, “outsourcing” – a word of
relatively recent vintage – continues to break down relationships that were
traditionally within the firm.111 What Alan Hyde said in 1998 continues to be true
106
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today: “Increasingly, labor is hired through short-term, market-mediated
arrangements that may not be ‘employment’ relations in any legal or technical
sense of that word.”112
During this new millennium, commentators have further analyzed the
dissolution of the traditional employment relationship. 113 The breakdown in
internal labor markets has occurred mainly with respect to workers on either end
of the skill spectrum. Low-skilled workers find themselves in at-will employment
contracts, which leave them exposed to outsourcing or replacement by other
temporary workers.114 Highly skilled workers are also less likely to be captured
by internal labor markets as they are able to leverage their skills in the
marketplace to move from project to project, employer to employer.115 Internal
labor markets have continued to dissolve as medium-skilled workers acquire
fewer firm-specific firms, move between firms more frequently, and do so with
more portable benefits at their disposal (especially defined contribution plans like
401k’s). 116 As Kathy Stone has argued, “Work has become contingent, not
merely in the sense that it is formally defined as short-term or episodic, but in the
sense that the attachment between the firm and the worker has been weakened.”117
If the corporation is giving way to a more contractually-oriented form of
business enterprise, and the employment relationship is dissolving back into the
market, then perhaps corporations (or their successor organizational forms) will
exist only to structure financial relationships and confer limited liability. What
would corporate law look like? What would employment law look like? The
possibility of a radically individualized future is not necessarily a nightmare for
progressive thinkers.
As low- and highly-skilled workers move out of internal labor markets
into external ones, one could imagine a variety of ways that they may come
together for mutual benefit. In some cases, this may take place on a relatively
small scale. For example, there is already some indication of a move to smaller,
more localized production in agriculture, as well as specialty foods like craft beer,
112
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smoked meats, and artisanal cheese.118 These small-bore firms promote greater
attention to detail and provide broader consumer choice. They may also
encourage greater freedom of movement within one’s career.
Smaller
agglomerations of individual workers who move from project to project, rather
than from firm to firm, may allow greater independence, and may provide
workers with greater bargaining power. The death of the massive public
corporation may engender a Jeffersonian-style renaissance of small producers and
greater attention to quality.
Of course, greater worker participation in the management of business
firms wouldn’t necessarily have to be limited to small-scale ventures. Workers
may, on a broad scale, enter into contracts that involve much more than the simple
exchange of labor for wages. In employee cooperatives, for example, workers
also have economic and managerial interests in the enterprise. 119 Each workermember in such a cooperative has input into the day-to-day and long term
decisionmaking of the firm on a one worker, one vote basis. 120 For larger
cooperatives, this power is exercised in the ability to elect members of a
governing board. 121 Worker-members share in both the decisionmaking and
profits.122
Employee cooperatives of this sort have already been successfully
established on large scales in agricultural settings. The plywood cooperatives in
the Pacific Northwest are a well-studied example. 123 More recently, the Tata
Group in India established a cooperative as part of a strategy of divesting itself of
a subsidiary, the Tetley Tea Company, which it had acquired for $450 million in
2000. 124 Instead of selling its agricultural plots to rich landowners or other
corporations, Tata sold a majority of them to former employees of the company
118
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and established a cooperative that was eventually known as the Kenan Devan
Hills Plantation Company (KDHP).125 The cooperative has place great emphasis
on outreach activities that involve health and education programs for their
workers and their communities. 126 KDHP now employs over 12,000 workers,
most of whom are also shareholders, and has become the largest tea company in
South India.127
Although employee cooperatives have traditionally been concentrated in
agricultural or other rural industries, the rise of the internet may facilitate
expansion of this particular business form. 128 As an initial matter, workers
interested in such a venture may find information and guidance on this type of
organizational structure more readily on the internet than otherwise possible. But,
more directly, the internet may allow like-minded workers separated by great
distances come together into a cooperative without the imposition of the type of
physical facilities and middle-management superstructure usually associated with
such ventures. And, more generally, the flexibility fostered by internet may
facilitate all sorts of productive combinations of workers.
Thus, workers, freed from traditional contractual norms associated with
internal labor markets, may thus come together in different ways, large and small.
Employee cooperatives give workers a role in decisionmaking and a share of the
profits. Other institutional structures offer variations on those themes. Germanstyle codetermination, for example, gives workers some decisionmaking authority
through its works councils, but no real access to the profits.129 Employee stock
ownership plans do the opposite—workers are entitled to a share of the firm’s
profits but have no real access to the decisionmaking process. 130 And though
Ribstein didn’t spend as much time contemplating the role of the worker in most
of his work on uncorporations, access to these types of organizational structures
are clearly within the individual orderings contemplated by his broad commitment
to contractarianism.
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Although internal labor markets aren’t expected to disappear anytime
soon, they, too, may move in the direction of greater contractual diversity. There
is already evidence that workers are engaging with external markets on a number
of fronts. Greater labor mobility, fewer firm-specific skills, and portable benefits
have already been mentioned. But there are a number of other ways in which the
traditional parties to a corporation might move toward greater worker
independence. While unions may continue to engage in their core functions of
negotiating and monitoring compliance with collective bargaining agreements,
workers may also contract with other union-like institutions that maintain varying
degrees of independence from employers. 131 Some of those institutions may
move closer to employers, and engage both managers and workers in a
consultative role. 132 Others may function more in the capacity of service
providers, completely disengaged from employers, and furnish workers with such
things as legal advice or opportunities for professional development. 133 For
example, the Freelancers’ Union provides affordable health insurance and access
to a health clinic with yoga classes and other services.134 As the Union’s founder
has argued, “If Gompers were alive today, he’d be trying to figure out what the
next models are for today’s workers.” 135 Labor, just like capital in Ribstein’s
vision of uncorporations, may begin to organize itself in a greater variety of
contractual arrangements.
While some of these changes may be under the control of the parties,
others may demand removal of some of the legal obstacles to free contracting.
Traditional unions could be freed up to bargain on such things that are currently
either illegal—such as hot cargo clauses 136 —or strongly discouraged—such as
employee representation on corporate boards.137 We could eliminate state “right
to work” laws, which prohibit unions and employers from freely bargaining for
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union security arrangements. 138 The creation of some of the quasi-union
organizations may also require some legal changes, such as lifting the ban on
prehire agreements139 or relaxing the rules on employer support of such employee
organizations. 140 These, and other changes set out in what what Samuel
Estreicher terms a “freedom of contract” agenda,141 may increase the number of
possible arrangements open to workers.
There may also be ways to enhance the contractual possibilities of those
workers who remain in internal labor markets. Although such workers, by
definition, move between firms relatively infrequently, those moves still occur
(and are, perhaps, more significant given their rarity). These workers also move
within firms as they are promoted, demoted, or transferred. At all of these
junctures, workers are faced with new contractual opportunities, however limited,
and would benefit from more information. One can imagine that organizations
could arise to provide that information about things such as a potential new firm’s
behavior in the past with respect to its workers; a current or new firm’s market
position; and wage and benefit data for comparable positions in the industry.
Armed with this kind of information, workers may be able to alter certain aspects
of their new employment contracts or, even in take-it-or-leave-it situations, make
better informed decisions.
Enhancing the contractual opportunities available to workers does have
some distinct advantages. Workers with better information may be able to tailor
contracts to better fit their personal situations. This may not only lead to better
contracts, but the sense of control over one’s worklife which would itself
contribute to a worker’s sense of well-being. And such positive engagement with
the employer would be beneficial to all corporate constituents.
There may be other advantages of moving toward a more contractarian
regime for workers. With more freedom to contract, one would expect workers to
enter into an increasingly diverse set of agreements that detail their relationships
with other constituents. This, in turn, may begin to break down the traditional
138
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distinctions between owners, managers, and workers. This is certainly true, by
definition, when it comes to the various forms of employee-owned or –managed
enterprises discussed above. But a blurring of roles may also take place in more
traditional corporations as workers, alone or in groups, begin to structure
contracts that involve more of what are usually considered ownership or
management rights.
Allowing workers to restructure their relationships with each other and
with other corporate constituents is certainly consistent with Ribstein’s
contractarian impulses and his development of the uncorporation. Workers, like
other corporate constituents, should be able to move beyond their traditional roles
and create contractual relationships that more fully satisfy their individual
preferences. This could be accomplished by altering some of the existing legal
structures governing their relationships with other firm constituents, much as
uncorporations undo many of the legal strictures of corporations.
Changing the legal restrictions and defaults with respect to employees is
one thing. But one wouldn’t have to go this far. Some good could come by
merely having workers (and other firm participants) act in new capacities.
Getting past the old categories would allow better expression of a full range of
people’s preferences. Under existing norms, corporate constituents tend to act on
preferences consistent with their roles in the corporation. At a very general level,
people acting in market contexts tend to focus on bottom-line considerations to
the exclusion of other preferences. 142 And, more specifically, shareholders
attempt to maximize profit; consumers attend to focus on price and product
quality.143 Non-market values—things like the social values of the corporation,
its treatment of workers, environmental impacts—fall by the wayside. Markets
then, are hegemonic—people act for personal gain and other values are reflected
in what they do with that gain.144
This is curious, however, because we know from a wide range of research
that people possess and act upon other-regarding preferences in non-market
contexts. 145 So what accounts for the apparent on-again, off-again nature of
people’s preferences? As we’ve argued elsewhere, one possibility is that people
do not consult their entire set of preferences when making decisions; instead, they
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rely upon a proper subset of their interests.146 Different contexts (e.g., market
versus non-market) and different roles may focus attention of different sets of
preferences. “Just as looking at a glass of cold water may focus one’s attention on
his thirst, staring at a prospectus may make one focus on a corporation’s
profitability.”147 Other preferences, even strongly held ones, may stay “offline” in
such situations.
Thus, enhancing the contractual freedom of workers and other constituents
may ultimately allow them to act in ways that maximize the full range of their
preferences. Workers could begin to think more like owners, and vice versa. And
such a state of affairs would complete the dream of any contractarian: to ensure
that markets reflected people’s preferences rather than the other way around.
At least, we should not reject this possibility. Larry Ribstein’s world is
one of greater economic freedom. Liberals have come to regard economic
freedom reflexively as promoting a winner-take-all state in which the vast
majority of workers are oppressed by capital. But it would not necessarily turn
out that way. The communist state is less “progressive” than an unrestrained
capitalist state would be, and economic freedom can promote personal freedom.
Progressives should take Ribstein’s challenge of promoting greater economic
flexibility as a way of promoting human flourishing. To the extent some people
would flail and fail under such a system, progressive should envision social
structures that would provide support. But these structures need not be a massive
regulatory state. Small-bore structures – micro-lending, employee ownership,
unions or trade groups that offer insurance and support – can help individuals
achieve success without the bureaucratic structures of a massive welfare state. It
may turn out that Ribstein’s world would look more like a 19th-Century English
industrial town than it would the buzzing, whizzing world of dynamic contractual
invention. But progressive should not assume such a scenario—not when there
are possibilities to explore.
The tide may be turning back to a more employee-oriented workplace.
Popular management literature emphasizes the importance of the employee. 148
Small startups, particularly in the tech industry, are once again blurring the line
between entrepreneur and employee.149 Academia is evolving, as well. Recent
research into the theory of the firm has focused on the importance of knowledge146
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based assets and the distribution of access top those assets within the firm.150 As
we learn more about the importance of trust, norms, and procedural justice within
the corporation, employees will grow even more in importance.151
It is possible to envision a radically individualized future, in which each
worker is a “corporation” unto herself and firms are merely temporary
agglomerations within the global market. It is also possible to envision a future in
which employees participate at the highest levels of governance, and corporations
are tools of team production rather than investor enrichment. Perhaps both of
these futures are in store, to varying degrees within different industries. Ribstein
has encouraged us to envision a decentralized, contractual future. Progressives
should take him up on it.
IV. Conclusion: Living in Larry’s Future
Larry Ribstein envisions a world that is not for the faint-hearted or
ignorant. It requires workers to look for the best use of their talents, and to enter
economic relationships that match best with their preferences and opportunities.
It is a world shorn of bureaucracy, but also shorn of standard forms. It eschews
bailouts and cronyism.152 It also asks us to keep on our toes, lest we fall behind or
be taken advantage of.
Progressives will want to look to the losers under such a system, and ask
about their fate. The safety net should be strong. 153 But at the same time,
progressives do not want to find themselves defending the “crony” capitalists, the
bureaucrats, the defenders of the status quo. A world of contractual freedom
offers tremendous opportunity for individuals to pursue their talents without the
encrustation of societal red tape or past practices to encumber them.
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A lot is riding, though, on how those contracts are constructed. It is not
surprising, then, that Ribstein’s world has a significant and creative role for
attorneys. In his article on legal education reform, Ribstein describes lawyers as
collaborators, manufacturers, lawmakers, information engineers, and
capitalists. 154 Constructing legal relationships in a variety of settings allows
attorneys to be much more influential in unlocking value within the economy. In
fact, the level of legal knowledge amongst all economic participants would need a
significant boost for participants to take full advantage of their economic freedom.
Lawyers and law schools could play an important role in this new economy—a
role that legal education has really yet to explore.
This essay has taken an optimistic, perhaps even Panglossian perspective
on the world of contractual freedom envisioned by Larry Ribstein. But we think
it is appropriate to do so, if only to get us started. Sticking with the tried-and-true
always seems safer. It was Larry’s hope that he could push us off of that secure
station, into an unknown but potentially limitless future.
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